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A B S T R A C T
Recently, the Court of Justice of the European Union issued decision C-131/12, which was
considered a major breakthrough in Internet data protection. The general public wel-
comed this decision as an actualization of the controversial “right to be forgotten”, which
was introduced in the initial draft for a new regulation on data protection and repeatedly
amended, due to objections by various Member States and major companies involved in
massive processing of personal data. This paper attempts to delve into the content of that
decision and examine if it indeed involves the right to be forgotten, if such a right exists at
all, and to what extent it can be stated and enforced.
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1. Introduction
In May 2014, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)
issued a decision1 which has been regarded as the enforce-
ment of the right to be forgotten in the scope of the European
Data Protection Directive (DPD). Although the decision of Google
Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, Mario
Costeja González does not explicitly mention a right to be for-
gotten, privacy advocates as well as the European Commission
have stated that the CJEU did not create a new right, but simply
applied the right to be forgotten, which was already present
(although not explicitly mentioned) in the existing legal
framework.2
This statement seems quite provocative and oversimpli-
fied. Preliminarily, it should be observed that a right to be
forgotten is not mentioned in the current DPD provisions, yet
it has been statutorily introduced in the proposed General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR). The GDPR comes from the evo-
lution of the DPD interpretation in the light of technological
developments since its adoption in 1995. However, whether the
right to be forgotten is just the interpretational evolution of
the principles that are within the DPD, or it represents a quid
pluris in the law, is debatable. In other words, could a judge really
enforce the right to be forgotten under the current legisla-
tion? Or is the statement that the CJEU affirmed the right to
be forgotten just an exaggeration?
Indeed, there has been a significant evolution in the inter-
pretation of data protection legislation. The DPD provisions
concerning the right to rectification3 and the right to object4
have been interpreted extensively and grouped under a general
category of the rights of the data subject (DS) over his or her
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1 European Court of Justice, Decision C-131/12, ECLI:EU:C:2014:317., 2014, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62012CJ0131.
2 See Section 6 infra.
3 Article 6(1), subparagraph d, Directive 95/46/EC.
4 Article 14, Directive 95/46/EC.
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data5 because these rights are not a novelty introduced by the
DPD, but stem from the already-existing principles that form
the basis of data protection in Europe. On the other hand,
however, the “right to be forgotten and to erasure”, as it is being
introduced by the reform, has its own provisions and regime
which are not yet in force. The Court is probably applying an
evolutive interpretation of existing principles, but stating that
it has officially introduced the right to be forgotten is perhaps
too much, especially considering that (as will be detailed in
Section 6.2) the content of the decision appears to differ from
that of the right to be forgotten.
Perhaps the Google Spain case can be better seen as a de-
velopment in the interpretation of the DPD provisions
concerning consent. Existing EU law does not provide the “right
to be forgotten”, but those provisions may still offer a basis to
enforce it.
In general, the processing of personal data requires that the
DS agrees by giving his or her informed consent. Addition-
ally, the GDPR introduces the right to be forgotten, which
requires the controller to erase the personal data. Both consent
and the erasure request are based on the intent of the DS. On
one side, giving one’s consent is the door that opens up the
lawfulness of the processing of personal data; on the other side,
the willingness to be forgotten (in the terms of the GDPR) is
the lock that makes further processing unlawful. At a first
glance, one could say that exercising the right to be forgotten
is an operation that is inverse to giving consent: essentially,
a withdrawal of consent. This seems to be a much more reason-
able ground to affirm a right to be forgotten, due to the complex
juridical nature of consent which opens it to different inter-
pretations. In other words, if the right to be forgotten already
exists between the lines of the DPD, it might be in the shape
of a withdrawal of consent.
The matter, however, is very delicate, because the DPD is
unclear whether it is possible to withdraw, or revoke, one’s
consent once it has been freely given. And even if that were
possible, there is no provision explaining what happens when
the consent is withdrawn or revoked.
In addition to that, some provisions within the DPD confer
on the DS the right to object to the processing of personal data.
While there is clearly a connection between the right to object
and the right to withdraw consent, it is arguable whether they
are actually the same right. If they are not, and the right to
be forgotten is not based on the withdrawal of consent, then
maybe it can be found as an application of the right to object.
This paper delves into the judicial concepts of consent and
the right to object, looking for similarities and differences in com-
parison to the right to be forgotten, to discover whether the seeds
of such a right can be found in either of these legal concepts.
According to the analysis in the following, the short answer
is no. It does not seem possible to infer the right to be forgot-
ten, as it is formulated in the current draft of the GDPR, from
the right to object, nor from a more generic withdrawal of
consent. In other words, we argue that since no right to be for-
gotten exists, the Google Spain decision (which does not
mention the right to be forgotten) addresses the matter from
a different perspective. Also, the content of the decision does
not match the obligations provisioned in Art. 17 of the GDPR
(as explained in Section 6.1). If this analysis is correct, then the
CJEU must rely on something else to issue the decision; and
that could be the right to object instead.
In the following, Section 2 gives an introduction to the legal
concept of consent, describing its nature and doctrinal analysis
in both Civil Law and Common Law systems. Section 3 com-
pares the concept of consent in data protection against the right
to object stated in the DPD and in Member State laws to deter-
mine whether the right to object can be used as a basis to assert
that a right to be forgotten exists under current legislation.After
arguing that the right to object is not the equivalent of with-
drawal of consent, Section 4 tries to find a generalized right to
withdraw consent among the provisions of the DPD.There does
not appear to be any generalized means of withdrawing consent,
but Member States are free to introduce it. Could such a right
be considered equivalent to the right to be forgotten? Again, the
analysis suggests that the two rights are not the same.
Then, Section 5 analyzes the reform proposal, trying to
outline the right to be forgotten in the GDPR, its relationship
with the withdrawal of consent, and the controversial prob-
lems related to it. Finally, Section 6 runs through the details
of the Google Spain decision and, based on the previous analy-
sis, tries to determine whether the statements about it enforcing
the right to be forgotten can be maintained, or the decision
is asserting something different.
2. Consent-based processing
Consent is crucial in data protection legislation, at any level.The
focus of this section is an analysis of consent under a legal point
of view, especially in the light of the protection of personal data.
2.1. Data protection and consent
When the DPD6 was adopted in 1995, it represented an evo-
lution in the concept of personal data and the means to enforce
5 There are actually two different classifications for the various
provisions of the DPD. Some early comments (Dag Elgesem, “The
Structure of Rights in Directive 95/46/EC on the Protection of In-
dividuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and the
Free Movement of Such Data,” Ethics and Information Technology 1,
no. 4 (1999): 283–93) tended to interpret the various rights of the
DS separately depending on their purpose, regarding the provi-
sions as being structured into several layers.The first layer concerns
the quality of the data, whereas a separate layer concerns the le-
gitimacy of the processing, including the right to object. This
classification is still being followed by some sources (Handbook on
European Data Protection Law, European Union Agency for Funda-
mental Rights, 2014). Other commentators (Fred H. Cate, “The EU
Data Protection Directive, Information Privacy, and the Public In-
terest,” Iowa Law Review 80, no. 3 (1995): 431–43) have embraced a
different interpretation according to which the Directive confers
upon the DS the right to exercise a control over his or her per-
sonal data, a right which is further detailed into a set of specific
powers. The latter classification appears to have been welcomed
in the draft Regulation, where all rights pertaining to the DS are
provisioned under Chapter III “Rights of the data subject”.
6 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to
the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such
data.
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its protection in a legislative environment. Starting from the
1970s, data protection law, with an origin rooted in Article 8
of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)7 had de-
veloped to a limited degree in Europe8. Additionally, in 1981,
with the adoption of the Council of Europe’s Convention 1089
the idea of data protection as a right worthy of protection began
to emerge. Over this time span, the first sparks of the com-
puter revolution were ignited.
By then, the legal concept of data protection followed two
completely different tracks, one in Europe and another in the
United States. This is due in part to the fact that the United
States did not adhere to the ECHR, and in part to the long evo-
lution that privacy had already gone through in US courts and
doctrinal analysis. Whereas in the United States the protec-
tion of personal data was born as a branch of the wider concept
of privacy, and to date it is still seen as one of its aspects and
protected under a common law tort10 in Europe it had evolved
as a concept of its own, separately from the concept of privacy.
It had become the individual’s right that personal informa-
tion about him or her be collected and processed in a fair way
and with a close relationship to the alleged purpose of the pro-
cessing. However, early legislative measures could not take into
account the massive collection and ubiquitous availability of
any sort of personal data which would be stored in huge data
centers and could allow a detailed profiling and traceability of
individuals.11 During the 1980s, computers reached a degree
of maturity that allowed any company or institution to have
some computing power; computer-based processing of per-
sonal data therefore started to gain some attention. The 1990s
saw the growth of the Internet, and with it the perception of
the risks it carried along for the users’ identities. Under these
premises, the DPD was approved.
2.2. Consent: a requirement of processing
One of the critical aspects of the DPD is that of the consent of
the DS. In the majority of situations, without the DS’s consent,
a data controller is not entitled to perform any of the opera-
tions that fall under the collective term of “processing” in the
language of the DPD.
Consent, however, is not the sole basis on which data pro-
cessing can be founded. Article 7 of the DPD defines the
conditions under which processing of personal data is to be
considered lawful. The DS’s intent is meaningful only under
subparagraph a (processing under the DS’s consent for spe-
cific purposes), and subparagraph b (when required for the
execution of, or prior to entering, a contract to which the DS
is party). These two subparagraphs numerically cover the ma-
jority of real-world processing. They also differ from the other
subparagraphs from the perspective of the interests in-
volved. Subparagraphs c through f address situations in which
there is a preeminent interest (legal or public). Instead, under
subparagraphs a and b the interests of the DS are not in a sub-
ordinate position with respect to those of the data controller.
Therefore, the situations in which the user’s intent is rel-
evant not only represent a numerical majority, but also a
sharper conflict between interests which are on the same level.
The legislator solved this conflict in favor of the data subject,
by requiring his or her consent before processing.
2.3. Legal nature of consent
Defining consent from a legal point of view is no easy task.
Although consent addresses a rather intuitive concept12 it
appears to be quite complex from a classificatory perspec-
tive. The consent of the right-holder is generally studied by
7 ECHR, Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life.
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life,
his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the
exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the
law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests
of national security, public safety or the economic well-being
of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights
and freedoms of others.
8 Hessische Datenschutzgesetz.
9 Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Au-
tomatic Processing of Personal Data – CETS No.: 108.
10 There has been a significant and controversial evolution in the
American privacy doctrine. William Lloyd Prosser, “Privacy,” California
Law Review 48, no. 3 (1960): 383–423 categorizes privacy torts into
four main families, of which only the fourth has a net relation-
ship with data protection. A brief survey can be found in Cesare
Bartolini, Privacy in the Information Society and the Principle of Neces-
sity (Saarbrücken, Germany: LAP Lambert Academic Publishing,
2013). However, it has been argued by Edward J. Bloustein, “Privacy
as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser,” N.Y.U.
Law Review 39, no. 6 (1964): 962–1007 that Prosser, in his mile-
stone analysis, only focused on the monetary impact of the privacy
intrusion, i.e., only when the identity of the plaintiff has a mon-
etary value, whereas the interest protected by the privacy torts, as
it had been originally suggested in Samuel D. Warren and Louis
D. Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy,” Harvard Law Review IV, no. 5 (1890):
193–220, is related to human dignity and not to property. Accord-
ing to Andrew Jay McClurg, “A Thousand Words Are Worth a Picture:
A Privacy Tort Response to Consumer Data Profiling,” Northwest-
ern University Law Review 98, no. 1 (2003): 63–143, pp. 107–113, this
mistake has led US courts to associate the privacy tort with the
right of publicity, thus denying protection in all situations where
the plaintiff’s identity did not have a commercial value. Simi-
larly, Samantha Barbas, “The Death of the Public Disclosure Tort:
A Historical Perspective,” Yale Journal of Law & The Humanities 22,
no. 2 (2010): 171–215 provides a detailed historical analysis of the
evolution of privacy in the United States, observing how the con-
trast between the freedom of expression and privacy has been won
by the former in courts.
11 Actually, the risks of massive data collection and the possibil-
ity for public institutions to control individuals through such
knowledge had already been envisioned by Stefano Rodotà,
Elaboratori Elettronici E Controllo Sociale, vol. 2, Quaderni dell’Irsta
(Strada Maggiore 37, 40125 Bologna, Italy: Il Mulino, 1973).
12 Tom O’Shea, “Consent in History, Theory and Practice” (Univer-
sity of Essex: Essex Autonomy Project, 2011) observes that “[a]t its
simplest, to consent is to give permission or reach agreement for
some activity to occur”, and in this meaning it predates any formal
approach to express consent.
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doctrine13 in the context of personality rights, in particular with
respect to personal identity and healthcare.
Generally speaking, its legal nature can be argued, seeing
it either as an act with intentional or unintentional legal
consequences.14 However, the matter appears to be of mostly
theoretical relevance. Especially in the light of the data pro-
tection legislation, the relationship with defects of consent is
independent of the contractual or non-contractual nature of
the consent.
Consent operates differently in the first two subparagraphs
Article 7 of the DPD. In subparagraph b, the preeminent inter-
est of the parties,and the processing of personal data is secondary.
This requirement is not present in subparagraph a,where it rather
appears that the data controller has an interest in processing
the DS’s personal data without an explicit contractual request
on the DS’s side. Subparagraph a has no relationship whatso-
ever with the (present or future) existence of a contract. The
initiative for the processing of personal data seems to reside more
on the data controller under subparagraph a, whereas it can
equally be on either party under subparagraph b.This might imply
that the legal nature of consent is mostly contractual under sub-
paragraph a, where the DS has to agree on a request by the data
controller, and non-contractual under subparagraph b, where
it appears more like a required clause of a contract (therefore
the contractual intent resides in the contract and not in the
consent to personal data processing).
Additionally, the DPD requires that the DS “must be given
accurate and full information,”15 and that the consent to data
processing be given in a free and informed way.16 Article 10
contains provisions concerning information that must be given
to the DS, applicable in all cases of collection of personal data,
regardless of the specific purpose of the processing. Finally,
consent is defined17 as freely given and informed indication
about the agreement to being processed.18 Together, these pro-
visions imply that the contractual or non-contractual nature
is not particularly relevant: in any case where the consent is
given under a defective situation, the processing is unlawful.
Under a doctrinal analysis, consent may be seen as a form
of acquittance: giving up one’s right that would prevent a con-
flict of interest, deciding not to exercise that right thus allowing
the other’s interest to prevail.19 In general, in the presence of
conflicting interests, a party giving consent implies an acqui-
escence of a right in favor of the other party’s interest.20 When
the conflicting interests are on the same level, unless a right
holder accepts the other party’s intrusion in his own private
13 See for example Ruth R. Faden and Tom L. Beauchamp, A History
and Theory of Informed Consent (200 Madison Avenue, New York,
New York 10016, USA: Oxford University Press, 1986); Joseph
Goldstein, “For Harold Lasswell: Some Reflections on Human Dignity,
Entrapment, Informed Consent, and the Plea Bargain,”The Yale Law
Journal 84, no. 4 (1975): 683–703; Adrian Popovici, “Personality Rights
– A Civil Law Concept,” Loyola Law Review 50, no. 2 (2004): 349–58.
A deep analysis by Thibault Gisclard, “Consent in Licenses of Per-
sonality Rights,” European Review of Private Law 22, no. 3 (2014):
345–70 covers the various means of granting and withdrawing
consent in a comparative perspective.
14 The reference is to a concept widely used in civil law coun-
tries. The German law places a strong emphasis on the concept
of Rechtsgeschäft, which is a juridical act in which the declara-
tion of will (Willenserklärung) forms the basis of the legal
consequences. According to Bénédicte Fauvarque-Cosson and Denis
Mazeaud, European Contract Law: Materials for a Common Frame
of Reference: Terminology, Guiding Principles, Model Rules,
European Private Law (München: Sellier, 2008), p. 82, the concept
is opposed to that of the real act (Realakt), where there is no
declaration of intent, but the mere presence of an act is suffi-
cient to produce the legal effect, and the juridical quasi-act
(geschäftsähnliche Handlungen) where the legal effect is the con-
sequence of a declaration, regardless of the underlying intention.
In Italy, a similar concept is focused around the notion of negozio
giuridico (Francesco Santoro-Passarelli, Dottrine Generali Del Diritto
Civile, 9th ed. (Eugenio Jovene, 1997), p. 126), where the will is pro-
ducing the legal effects, together with the cause of the act, which
is its social and economic function. The distinction is fundamen-
tal in the law theory of those systems, because the law reacts
depending on whether an act is relevant independently of the intent
of having the legal consequences of that act, or it is made pur-
posefully to enact those legal consequences. In the former case,
the mere occurrence of the act is enough to trigger the legal con-
sequences, independently of the actor’s real intent; in the latter
case, the intent of the actor is the trigger for the legal conse-
quences, so that a vitiated intent may prevent them from occurring.
Common law systems generally do not know a similar juridical
figure, which descends from Roman law; the classical common law
theory founding the validity of a contract is consideration, which
is the expectation of a counter performance by the other party. The
European principles of contract law at Article 2:102 use the concept
of intention that gives relevance to the party’s will in a way similar
to civil law systems (see Ole Lando and Hugh Beale, eds., The Prin-
ciples Of European Contract Law, Parts I And II (Kluwer Law
International, 5 11 19992014), pp. 144–145).
15 Recital 38 of the DPD.
16 Recital 70 of the DPD.
17 Article 2, subparagraph h: “‘the data subject’s consent’ shall
mean any freely given specific and informed indication of his wishes
by which the data subject signifies his agreement to personal data
relating to him being processed”.
18 The legislative expression is significant. “Freely given” denotes
that consent must be given in the absence of coercion or vio-
lence, whereas “informed” means that the data subject should be
aware of what he or she is consenting to, what data will be pro-
cessed, and the reason why. In case the consent is not freely given
or lacking sufficient information, it would be vitiated, and the data
subject might request that the controller cease all processing.
19 Under this perspective, consent is not a passive tolerance of the
other party exercising the conflicting interest. Rather, it is a con-
scious decision that can be expressed in an implicit manner.
According to Faden and Beauchamp, A History and Theory of In-
formed Consent, p. 235, “[c]onsents and refusals are actions[,] acts
of autonomous authorizing [or] declining to authorize”.
20 Santoro-Passarelli, Dottrine Generali Del Diritto Civile, p. 53, reckons
that “the revocable consent of the person to exposition or publi-
cation [. . .] stands as a statement that in the concrete situation
there exists no interest in privacy”. Heidi M. Hurd, “The Moral Magic
of Consent,” Legal Theory 2, no. 02 (1996): 121–46, p. 123 argues that
consent can operate in two different ways: it can transform the
morality of another’s conduct, so that an action that would nor-
mally be wrong becomes right when endorsed by the other party’s
consent; and it allows another to do a wrong act, meaning that the
act does not become right by virtue of consent, but rather the
consent defeats any rights that the actor not do the wrong act, thus
waiving a defense. Ibid., p. 131 compares the behavior of the con-
senting person to that of an accomplice, in the sense that consent,
by act or omission, provides an aid to the actor’s actions; also, the
mental state of the consenting person is not the same of the wrong-
doer, just as the accomplice’s behavior is not supported by the same
degree of culpability required to actually commit the offense.
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rights, any activity by the other party is illegitimate. The user’s
consent opens up the possibility for the other party to pursue
its interest, within the limits of the consent released.
However, the concept of consent as surrender is inappro-
priate in the scope of the protection of personal data.21 The DS
does not simply abandon the right over his or her personal data
by giving his or her consent.22 Consent has a more proce-
dural function as far as data protection is concerned. By giving
consent, the DS maintains a degree of control over the pro-
cessing, as well as remedies in case of unlawful processing.23
The DS becomes actively involved in a dynamic relationship
with the data controller to ensure that the processing is lawful,
within the limits of the consent, and fair.24
Under Common Law, consent is seen as a procedural jus-
tification. Simply put, if a person consents to another person
doing something to him or her, and later claims that the (con-
sented) behavior consisted of a wrongdoing, the given consent
can be used by the defendant as a means of defense.25 Again,
while the classification may be appealing in a general context,
this does not appear to be a satisfactory assumption regard-
ing consent in personal data protection. First, acquiring the DS’s
consent is not sufficient to guarantee that the data controller
will not incur in liability, as there are a number of principles
and rules (proportionality, necessity and so on) that further re-
strict the limits of data processing, regardless of consent.
Second, by consenting, the DS establishes an active relation-
ship involving the processing of personal data.
Regardless of the contractual or non-contractual nature of
consent, for the purposes of personal data protection it behaves
as a condition precedent to the processing, i.e., the lawfulness
of any processing activity is subject to the consent of the DS26
and (with respect to subparagraph b) the contract cannot be
executed by any of the parties without the consent. More spe-
cifically, it acts as a condicio iuris27 because the requirement is
introduced by the law and not by the parties. Also, although
operating in the sole interest of one of the parties (the DS), it
does not appear that the condition can be renounced by the
DS, since it is the expression of a public interest in a fair and
lawful processing of personal data. In other words, the DS would
not be entitled to generically give up his or her control over
any future processing and personal data by the data controller.
Additionally, the DPD requires that consent be given by the
DS, but does not mention anything about the time at which
it must be given. Any processing carried out prior to obtain-
ing the consent is certainly unlawful, but doubts may arise over
what happens when the DS gives consent to the processing:
whether the consent also operates as a date of commence-
ment, with an ex nunc lawfulness of the processing, leaving the
data controller liable for any processing that occurred previ-
ously; or if it operates retroactively, with an ex tunc effect, giving
lawfulness to previous processing, or at least to the part of it
which was carried out within the boundaries of the subse-
quent consent. The Directive is not explicit about this. In the
absence of any provisions, unless the DS expressly requests
that data processing is allowed only for the future, it would
be logical to assume that, once consent is given, it pertains to
all processing carried out within the alleged purposes, regard-
less of whether it was previously illegitimate.
The matter is far from having a merely theoretical interest.
In fact, a lot of service providers on the Internet start collecting
data about their users as soon as they start surfing their web
sites,either by collecting data about the users’ location, IP address,
providers,user agent,navigation preferences, search queries,and
so on, or by storing cookies onto the user’s computer, to main-
tain data across different visits and keep profiling users in the
future. It is generally recognized that storing a cookie onto a user’s
browser is a form of data processing from the point of view of
the DPD.28 In most cases, this “up-front” processing is carried
out without requesting any consent by the user, and thus is per-
formed unlawfully from the perspective of the DPD. Later, if the
21 Although, in the early years of personal data protection,the concept
of acquittance was considered adequate. According to Gerhard
Robbers, “Der Grundrechtsverzicht. Zum Grundsatz ‘volenti Non Fit
Iniuria’ Im Verfassungsrecht,” Juristische Schulung 25, no. 12 (1985):
925–31, p. 928, an individual can waive the protection of his or her
own personal data by giving consent to their transfer and process-
ing, on the basis of Articles 1 and 2 of the German Fundamental Law.
22 Sebastian Reimer, “Die Datenschutzrechtliche Zustimmung”
(Universität Wien, 2010): “there is always an exercise of the fun-
damental right and not a waiver of the right itself”.
23 Giorgio Resta, “Revoca Del Consenso Ed Interesse Al Trattamento
Nella Legge Sulla Protezione Dei Dati Personali,” Rivista Critica Del
Diritto Privato 18, no. 2 (2000): 299–333, pp. 304–306.
24 Andreas Geiger, “Die Einwilligung in Die Verarbeitung von
Persönlichen Daten Als Ausübung Des Rechts Auf Informationelle
Selbstbestimmung,” Neue Zeitschrift Für Verwaltungsrecht 8, no. 1 (1989):
35–37 highlights two aspects of the DS’s right of control over his
or her own personal data. As a defensive right it grants protec-
tion to individuals against unlimited collection, storage, use and
disclosure of their personal data; as a positive guarantee, the right
to informational self-determination for the individual confers the
power to basically decide on disclosure and use of personal data.
25 Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword, Consent in the Law, Legal
Theory Today (16C Worcester Place, Oxford OX1 2JW, UK: Hart Pub-
lishing, 2007), pp. 59–63. The authors further distinguish consent
in two subcategories. The former is the one expressed in the text,
where “the consenting agent, A, is precluded from raising a com-
plaint about the conduct of the recipient agent B”; in the latter,
consent is given with respect to a rule-set, which one party pros-
pects to the other (as may be the case of a contract), and the person
who gives the consent “is precluded from denying that he or she
is bound by the rules (the rights and obligations) to which he or
she has consented”.
26 It is worth repeating that this statement only embraces pro-
cessing based on consent (subparagraphs a–b of Article 7).
27 A condicio iuris is a condition that is automatically applied to a
juridical act by the law and not by the parties’ will. The fact that
the DS’s consent determines the lawfulness of the processing is
not a consequence of the will of the parties, so it is not a volun-
tary condition.
28 The use of cookies has been viewed as a threat for a long time.
The issue came to the attention of the general public when the
online advertising company DoubleClick Inc. planned to acquire
the marketing company Abacus Direct, because DoubleClick, by
means of its cookies, had collected information on over 100 million
Americans (Ira S. Rubinstein, Ronald D. Lee, and Paul M. Schwartz,
“Data Mining and Internet Profiling: Emerging Regulatory and Tech-
nological Approaches,” The University of Chicago Law Review 75, no.
1 (2008): 261–85). Over time, users have developed some attention
to cookies, but cookie techniques have evolved as well in re-
sponse to the heightened attention (Chris Jay Hoofnagle et al.,
“Behavioral Advertising: The Offer You Can’t Refuse,” Harvard Law
& Policy Review 6, no. 2 (2012): 273–96).
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user subscribes to that service (and is therefore required to give
consent to the data processing), those data are silently merged
with all subsequent ones. In doing this, the DS has silently ac-
quiesced and made lawful something that had already happened
and was unlawful prior to his or her consent.
The function of consent in personal data protection has been
debated as well.29
While the original idea of consent as an expression of the
autonomy of the DS might be considered appropriate in the
past30 the recent technological developments have made it in-
efficient. It has been observed that autonomy is based on three
factors: intentionality, understanding and controlling
influences.31 A different approach32 is centered around the duties
of the data processor, that is, obligations stemming from the
law or ethical regulations.33 Finally, a third approach to consent
is based on the DS’s rights: the acquisition of consent must
be respectful of the fundamental rights of the DS, in the light
of his or her autonomy.34 However, it has also been noted that
acquiring the “informed consent” of the DS is no longer a viable
solution to protect his or her personal data.35
Questions arising from the legal nature and effects of
consent are interesting from a doctrinal perspective, but the
real significance of the matter is related to the withdrawal of
consent.36 The DPD does not provide a general provision for
withdrawing already-given consent.Therefore, legitimate ques-
tions would include whether it is possible for a DS to withdraw
consent, thus preventing data processing. In case withdrawal
is possible, to what extent should it be allowed? What is the
legal nature of the withdrawal? How should the withdrawal
occur and what would its effects be? And, what should happen
to data already collected and processed?
3. The right to object
The DPD does not include a general right of the DS to with-
draw consent, as there are no provisions whatsoever requiring
Member States to implement the right to withdraw consent
once it has been given freely and based on fair and complete
information.37 This section analyzes the relationship between
the right to be forgotten and the right to object, trying to de-
termine if, while not explicitly provided by the Directive, the
former can be inferred from the latter.
3.1. The right to object in the DPD
The DPD provides a right of objection to data processing under
certain circumstances. Of course, the right to object to per-
sonal data processing has a strong relationship with the right
to be forgotten. Indeed, if the DPD granted a generalized right
to object to the processing of personal data, such a right could
be used to prevent the data controller to perform any further
processing involving that subject. However, based on the for-
mulation of the right to object in the DPD and in the legislation
of Member States, the right to object does not seem to extend
to encompass a full-fledged right to be forgotten.
In its premise, the DPD requires that the DS should have the
right “to object to processing in certain circumstances”.38 As for
the nature of these circumstances, other recitals provide some
clarifications.When data are processed for the purpose of mar-
keting, this right should be granted“at no cost and without having
to state his reasons”.39 On the other hand, when the data pro-
cessing is not based on the DS’s consent, but for example for
public interests, the DS should have the more limited right “on
29 An accurate analysis of several approaches to consent is offered
by Eleni Kosta, Consent in European Data Protection Law, vol. 3, Nijhoff
Studies in European Union Law (Plantijnstraat 2, 2321 JC Leiden,
The Netherlands: Brill, 2013), pp. 130–140.
30 Faden and Beauchamp, A History and Theory of Informed Consent,
passim.
31 This view is challenged by Kosta, Consent in European Data Pro-
tection Law, p. 138. When consent is provided by means of a
checkbox, there is no guarantee the DS has actually read or un-
derstood the data protection policy.
32 Neil C. Manson and Onora O’Neill, Rethinking Informed Consent
in Bioethics (University Printing House, Shaftesbury Road, Cam-
bridge, CB2 8BS, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
33 According to Kosta, Consent in European Data Protection Law, p.
138, this concept is questionable as well, because most modern ser-
vices processing personal data do not rely on a personal relationship
between the DS and the data controller, but are based on stan-
dard forms and documents.
34 This is the view endorsed, among others, by ibid, pp. 138–139;
Antoinette Rouvroy and Yves Poullet, “The Right to Informational
Self-Determination and the Value of Self-Development: Reassess-
ing the Importance of Privacy for Democracy,” in Reinventing Data
Protection?, ed. Serge Gutwirth et al. (Springer,The Netherlands, 2009),
45–76; Roger Brownsword,“Consent in Data Protection Law: Privacy,
Fair Processing and Confidentiality,” in Reinventing Data Protection?,
ed. Serge Gutwirth et al. (Springer, The Netherlands, 2009), 83–110,
because it “safeguards the central role to the consent of the data
subject”, in line with Europe’s strong protection of human rights.
35 According to Bart W. Schermer, Bart Custers, and Simone van
der Hof, “The Crisis of Consent: How Stronger Legal Protection May
Lead to Weaker Consent in Data Protection,” Ethics and Information
Technology 16, no. 2 (2014): 171–82, “consent overload, information
overload, and the absence of meaningful choice leads to ‘consent
desensitisation’.Users no longer make active, informed choices when
confronted with a consent situation, but instead simply provide
consent when consent is asked”. Alessandro Acquisti, “Nudging
Privacy: The Behavioral Economics of Personal Information,” IEEE
Security & Privacy 7, no. 6 (2009): 82–85 suggests a “soft-paternalism”
solution, by designing systems in such a way that they “nudge” in-
dividuals, offering them “the option of more informed choices”.
36 In a comparative analysis on the possibility to withdraw consent
in personality rights, Gisclard, “Consent in Licenses of Personal-
ity Rights” observes that “[t]he existence of a right of withdrawal
is highly controversial in many countries, even in those where the
law specifically confers on the person the right to withdraw her
consent”.
37 Eventually, the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) sanc-
tioned that the possibility of withdrawing one’s consent is implicit
in the DPD (see European Data Protection Supervisor, Privacy and
Competitiveness in the Age of Big Data: The Interplay between Data Pro-
tection, Competition Law and Consumer Protection in the Digital Economy,
2014, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_EDPS-14-6_en.htm, p. 15,
note 39). However, this statement has been released almost twenty
years after the DPD was in force, and in the light of the new reform
proposal, which explicitly allows withdrawing consent at any time.
The timing of such a statement raises legitimate doubts as to
whether this was the real intention of the DPD since its origin.
38 Recital 25.
39 Recital 30.
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legitimate and compelling grounds relating to his particular situ-
ation, to object to the processing of any data relating to himself”.40
This specific protection is further softened because “Member
States may nevertheless lay down national provisions to the
contrary”.41 Such premises are actually matched in the Direc-
tive provisions, which allow the DS to object to data processing
carried out under public interests or the legitimate interests of
the data controller or third parties.42 In any situation where the
data are processed for the purpose of direct marketing, the right
to object to the processing must be granted at any time and free
of charge43. In other words, the DPD does indeed grant the DS
the right to object, but in a limited scope which can be further
narrowed by national legislation.
3.2. Implementation by Member States
Member States have not drifted much from the right to object
of the DPD.
UK legislation grants the DS a generalized right “to require
the data controller [. . .] to cease, or not to begin, processing”
if it can “cause substantial damage or substantial distress”44;
if the processing takes place for the purposes of direct mar-
keting, then it can be prevented at any time.45 Similarly, Italy
grants the DS a right of opposition to data processing “for le-
gitimate reasons”, or in any case of direct marketing.46
The Spanish law confers a slightly stronger protection to the
DS. The data protection law47 does not include a provision on
the right of objection, but defers it to a ruling48 which grants
the right to object under conditions which are essentially the
same as those in the DPD; additionally, however, the DS may
object to the processing when its purpose is the taking of a de-
cision based solely on an automated processing of personal data.
In Portugal, a right of opposition is granted under stricter
conditions, because it requires “serious and legitimate reasons
related to his or her personal situation” and the opposition must
be justified. In any case of data processing for the purpose of
direct marketing, the right of opposition is exercisable without
any conditions or justification.49 Similarly, the German law en-
titles the DS to object to data processing if “the data subject’s
legitimate interest outweighs the controller’s interest”50 or
without any requirements in case the processing is for adver-
tising, marketing or opinion research.51
Luxembourg grants more or less the same right, in which
the DS can issue an “opposition justifiée” to processing “for capital
and legitimate reasons pertaining to his or her peculiar situ-
ation”, or in case of direct marketing. However, an additional
provision expressly allows the DS to object before data are dis-
closed for the first time to third parties for marketing purposes.52
Lithuanian law allows the DS to object to data processing
that is carried out by public authorities or in the interests of
the data controller or third parties (in the form of a written
notice and “legally motivated”), or (“without providing reasons”)
for purposes of direct marketing or survey.53
3.3. The right to object and the right to be forgotten
Summarizing this overview, both the European Directive and
Member State laws grant the DS some means of objecting to
personal data processing, but this right can be exercised only
if any of the following is true:
• he or she has a legitimate interest which outweighs those
of the data controller, or the processing can potentially cause
damage or distress, or, more generically, there are compel-
ling and legitimate reasons to object. In this case, the DS
may be required to provide a justification for the objec-
tion to be valid;
• the processing is carried out for the purpose of direct mar-
keting, or in some cases for market research. The DS can
object to such processing at any time and without
justification;
• Member States can grant the right to object in situations
not taken into account by the DPD, but this rarely occurs.
In addition to this, the DPD allows the DS the right to rec-
tification or erasure of incomplete or inaccurate data.54 However,
this provision clearly has a more limited scope than the right
to object, because it operates only when data are inaccurate
or incomplete, but also does not prevent the controller to carry
on with the data processing, in contrast with the right to object
where further data processing is prohibited if the objection
meets the requirements.
Therefore, neither in the DPD nor in national legislation is
there any general provision granting the DS the right to object.
The right to object cannot be used as a generalized means to
prevent the data controller from processing the DS’s per-
sonal data. More notably, it does not appear that the right to
40 Recital 45.
41 Ibid.
42 Article 14: “Member States shall grant the data subject the right:
(a) to object at any time on compelling legitimate grounds relat-
ing to his particular situation to the processing of data relating to
him, save where otherwise provided by national legislation. Where
there is a justified objection, the processing instigated by the con-
troller may no longer involve those data”.
43 Article 14, subparagraph b.
44 UK Data Protection Act, Section 10.
45 UK Data Protection Act, Section 11.
46 Italian d.lgs. 196/2003, art. 7, subparagraph 4.
47 Spanish Ley orgánica 15/1999.
48 Spanish Ley orgánica 15/1999, article 17(1) and Spanish Real Decreto
1720/2007, article 34.
49 Portuguese lei no. 67/98, article 12.
50 German Bundesdatenschutzgesetz, Section 20(5).
51 German Bundesdatenschutzgesetz, Section 28(4).
52 Luxembourgish loi du 2 août 2002, art. 30, subparagraph c.
53 Lithuanian. Istatymas Nr. I-1374, article 27. Interestingly, the
article, in its official English translation found at http://www3.lrs.lt/
pls/inter3/dokpaieska.showdoc_l?p_id=435305, is titled “Data Sub-
ject’s Right to Withhold His Consent to the Processing of His Personal
Data”, possibly placing the withholding of consent in relation-
ship with the right to object. While this may appear weird from
the perspective of other Member State laws, it is perfectly in line
with the spirit of the Lithuanian law, especially in the light of article
14(1), according to which “Personal data may be processed for the
purposes of direct marketing only after the data subject gives his
consent”. In other words, Lithuania places more emphasis on the
DS’s consent, regulating the processing of personal data for mar-
keting purposes on an opt-in basis.
54 Article 6(1), subparagraph d.
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be forgotten (as it is defined in the GDPR, thus allowing the
erasure of the data and the propagation of the erasure request)
can be inferred on the basis of a general application of the right
to object. Various differences emerge between the two, con-
cerning both the prerequisites and the effects.
Concerning the prerequisites, the right to be forgotten does
not have any specific requirements to be exercised, because
the DS can simply withdraw his or her consent, thus enact-
ing the provisions of Article 17(1), subparagraph b of the GDPR.
The right to object, instead, can be exercised only if either of
the following conditions is met:
• an objective requirement, related to the purpose of the data
processing (direct marketing, and sometimes other
purposes);
• a subjective requirement, meaning that the DS must allege
some proof of damage or distress, or have some legiti-
mate grounds to object.
Concerning the effects, the right to object simply states that
the processing “may no longer involve those data”55 whereas
the right to be forgotten entitles the DS to obtain the erasure
of the data and the propagation of the request.56
4. Withdrawing consent
Given that the right to be forgotten does not exist on the basis
of the right to object, another basis for it might be found in
the withdrawal of consent. The question, then, becomes
whether such a right actually exists.
4.1. Withdrawing consent under European legislation
The DPD does not explicitly grant the DS the right to with-
draw consent.57 However, this does not mean that this right
does not exist in the Directive. Member States can also imple-
ment it, since the spirit of the DPD allows them flexibility in
raising the level of protection of the DS.
Some references to the DS’s entitlement to withdraw his
or her consent can be found in the Electronic Privacy Directive
(EPD)58 an integration of the DPD with respect to electronic
communications.59 The EPD grants the DS the right, limited to
certain specific categories of personal data, to actually with-
draw the consent that was previously given. Namely, this right
can be exercised only with respect to data related to traffic over
telecommunication networks60 and geolocalization or loca-
tion data.61 For these types of data, consent can be withdrawn
“at any time”; but, apart from them, the EPD does not explic-
itly confer DSs a generalized right to revoke their consent.
Can this limited right be used to infer a generalized right to
withdraw consent, implicitly granted by the DPD? If such were
the case, then one might wonder why the DPD grants a gen-
eralized right implicitly, and later the EPD explicitly states it
for certain categories of personal data. Since the two direc-
tives are several years apart, it might be argued that the legislative
technique was different between them, so that the former con-
tains an implicit right to withdraw one’s consent while the latter
provides a further specification on the withdrawal of consent
for certain types of data.62 However, even if these were the in-
tentions of the European Commission, the Member States’
different approaches suggest that the DPD does not provide a
general right to withdraw consent, not even implicitly.63
4.2. Differences in Member State laws
Some national laws have a single law implementing both the
DPD and the EPD. Under the law of these Member States, the
right to withdraw one’s consent is present in the scope of
the EPD, but not in that of the DPD. Essentially, these States
55 Article 14(1), subparagraph b of the DPD.
56 It appears that the right to be forgotten has a wider scope and
effect than the right to object, and the latter is rather a subset of
the former. The legislative provisions support this view, because
one of the reasons to exercise the right to be forgotten is the right
to object granted by Article 19 of the GDPR, which essentially cor-
responds to the right to object as defined in the DPD. However, there
is a major difference in the “new” right to object, and that is an
inversion of burden of proof: whereas in Article 14 of the DPD it is
the DS that must allege “compelling legitimate grounds” to object,
Article 19 of the GDPR requires the data controller to demon-
strate “compelling legitimate grounds [. . .] which override the
interests [. . .] of the data subject”.
57 See Section 3.1 supra.
58 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data
and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications
sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications).
59 The field of application of the EPD is more restricted than that
of the DPD, since it is limited to data protection in the electronic
communication sector (thus not covering more “traditional” con-
texts such as non-electronic archives or general principles in data
processing), but it provides a more detailed regime in that scope.
Simply put, the DPD entered into force when the Internet was in
its early stages, and after a few years the need for additional pro-
tection in electronic communications had already emerged. See
https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/edps/EDPS/Dataprotection/
Legislation.
60 Recital 26 and Article 6(2) of the EPD.
61 Recital 35 and Article 9 of the EPD.
62 This idea has been expressed by the European Data Protec-
tion Supervisor, Privacy and Competitiveness in the Age of Big Data:
The Interplay between Data Protection, Competition Law and Consumer
Protection in the Digital Economy, p. 15: consent “may be withdrawn,
in which case any personal data pertaining to the data subject
should be erased”. See also footnote 37 supra.
63 The opinion is debated. In particular, “[t]he Data Protection Di-
rective does not mention a general right to withdraw consent at
any time”, but despite the text of the DPD provisions “such a right
exists and [. . .] it must be possible for the data subject to exer-
cise it at his or her discretion” (Handbook on European Data Protection
Law, p. 60). However, this appears more to be the outcome of the
developments in the interpretation of the DPD. This seems to be
confirmed by the very same source: “[t]here should be no require-
ment to give reasons for withdrawal and no risk of negative
consequences over and above the termination of any benefits which
may have derived from the previously agreed data use”. This state-
ment sounds more like a suggestion for the interpretation of the
law, hinting at the fact that there currently is no express right to
withdraw consent, but it should be either provided, or at least en-
forced through an extensive interpretation of the DPD.
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grant the right to withdraw consent with respect to specific
types of data, without offering a general provision on a gen-
eralized right to withdraw consent for all personal data. It would
appear inconsistent for the same law to grant the right ex-
plicitly in some sectorial contexts and implicitly as a general
rule. In other words, when data protection law legislation in-
cludes some provisions about the right to withdraw one’s
consent regarding some specific type of data, these appear more
as an exceptional provision than the expression of a more
generic right which can be derived implicitly from the general
principles of the law.
For example, Italy revised its data protection law in 2003,
superseding the previous law and implementing both the DPD
and the EPD within the same act. This statute provides that
the DS has the right to withdraw consent to the processing of
certain categories of personal data, namely traffic data64 and
location data65 and in both cases it is stated that the consent
is “revocable at any moment”.66
Most Member States have separate implementing legisla-
tion for the DPD and the EPD. Concerning these, the situation
may vary depending on whether the transposition of the DPD
contains provisions on consent withdrawal or it does not. In
the latter case, the same uncertainties expressed above with
respect to the relationship between the two directives can be
repeated for the national law. For example, such is the case
with the United Kingdom, where data protection is separate
from the provisions on privacy in electronic communica-
tions, which is contained in a regulation.67 While the latter
correctly allows the DS to withdraw consent to the process-
ing of certain types of data (namely location, traffic and
marketing), the Data Protection Act does not provide any hint
whatsoever as to the possibility of withdrawing consent in a
generalized way. This possibility might or might not be in-
ferred implicitly from the general principles of the law.68
Other States have separate legislative instruments for the
two directives, but still the general data protection law covers
withdrawal of consent to some extent. Germany is one of these:
the Bundesdatenschutzgesetz does not provide a general right to
withdraw consent, nor does it have any reference to traffic or
location data (which are in the scope of the EPD and not of
the DPD). However, with respect to data processing for com-
mercial purposes, “the controller ensures that the declaration
of consent is recorded and the data subject can access and
revoke it at any time with future effect”.69 Again, it would appear
problematic to assume that this is the expression of a more
general principle to withdraw one’s consent to any process-
ing regardless of the type of data involved, especially in the
light that data processing for marketing purposes is on a lower
level compared to the rights of the DS, as is shown already in
the DPD which grants a generalized right to object to such
processing.70
An outstanding exception to this scenario is the Spanish
ley orgánica transposing the DPD. Since there is no relation-
ship between ley orgánica 15/1999 and the EPD, it makes no
reference to traffic data or location data. However, the Spanish
data protection law contains an explicit provision allowing the
DS to revoke previously given consent “when there are justi-
fied grounds for doing so”; the law also details the temporal
effect of the revocation, so that it “does not have retroactive
effect”.71 Additional provisions state that “consent for the com-
munication of personal data may also be revoked”72 and that
the inclusion of data in publicly accessible data bases require
a consent “which may be revoked at any time”.73
In short, the Spanish law explicitly grants the DS the right
to revoke a previously-given consent.This right is different from
the right of objection, which is nonetheless granted by the
Spanish law.74
Although the Spanish law cannot speak for all Member
States nor for the EU, together with the other hints which are
present in the different legislations, it can be argued that a right
to revoke/withdraw one’s consent can be envisioned, and that
it is different from the right to object which is present in EU
and national legislation.The main differences between the right
to withdraw consent and the right to object are:
• the right to withdraw one’s consent clearly requires that
the DS has already given consent to the processing of his
or her personal data, whereas the right to object does not
have such a requirement;
• according to the DPD, the right to object to data process-
ing must be implemented in Member State laws. On the
other hand, based on the EPD, the right to withdraw consent
is required only for certain categories of data;
• the right to object normally requires the DS to allege some
proof of a potential harm that the data processing can cause,
or at least justify the reasons for objecting, whereas the right
to withdraw consent does not require any justification.
64 Italian d.lgs. 196/2003, art. 123(3).
65 Italian d.lgs. 196/2003, art. 126(1).
66 However, the Italian doctrine generally assumes that consent to
the processing of personal data is revocable.See, for example,Santoro-
Passarelli, Dottrine Generali Del Diritto Civile: “the revocable consent
of the person to exposition or publication [. . .] stands as a state-
ment that in the concrete situation there exists no interest in privacy”
(emphasis added); Davide Messinetti,“Circolazione Dei Dati Personali
E Dispositivi Di Regolazione Dei Poteri Individuali,” Rivista Critica Del
Diritto Privato 16, no. 3 (1998): 339–407 and footnote 79 infra.
67 UK regulation 2003 No. 2426, The Privacy and Electronic Com-
munications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003.
68 However, concerning the UK legislation, it has been argued that
it would be very unlikely that a general right to withdraw one’s
consent can be found within the folds of the Data Protection Act.
In particular, in Liam Curren and Jane Kaye, “Revoking Consent:
A ‘blind Spot’ in Data Protection Law?,” Computer Law & Security
Review 26, no. 3 (2010): 273–83, the authors note that in the par-
liamentary debates a right to withdraw one’s consent was assumed
to be present; however, due to the wording of the law (and of the
directive it transposed), interpreting it in the sense of a general right
to withdraw a previously given consent would lead to an inher-
ent contradiction in the law. Alternatively, it would be possible to
operate on Article 8 of the ECHR to infer a right of withdrawal, but
apart from the fact that this would seem a very feeble connec-
tion, it could be pointless because the DS could contractually give
up his right to withdraw consent if such a situation were envi-
sioned in a contract.
69 German Bundesdatenschutzgesetz, Section 28(3a).
70 See Subsection 3.1 supra.
71 Spanish Ley orgánica 15/1999, article 6(3).
72 Ibid., article 11(4).
73 Ibid., article 28(1).
74 See Section 3.2.
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That said, the possibility for the DS to withdraw previously-
given consent, in most cases, has not been granted by Member
States as a generalized provision, but only against the processing
of those types of data for which it is required by the EPD.75
4.3. Effects of consent withdrawal
Since the DPD does not grant an explicit right to withdraw a
previously given consent, it leaves some open questions about
its legal nature and the effects that it has on personal data
processing.
Both questions can be addressed by looking back at the legal
nature of consent.76 If the DS’s consent acts as a condition prec-
edent, the main question is how its withdrawal operates.
Because personal data processing is lawful only in the pres-
ence of the DS’s consent, once such consent is withdrawn no
further processing is allowed. However, the definition of “pro-
cessing” is rather wide, encompassing a large number of
activities; a sample of activities embraced by the general term
“processing” is given in the DPD.77 These certainly include col-
lection, recording, and storage. Therefore, once the consent is
withdrawn, any further collection and storage of personal data
is prohibited. The data controller is not allowed to retrieve any
additional personal data about the DS, or make any use of those
already acquired.78 Undoubtedly, the overall spirit of the DPD
implies that no further data can be collected once the consent
is withdrawn.
The matter is more problematic when it comes to data that
have already been collected. In other words, does the with-
drawal of consent operate as a form of revocation, with an ex
tunc effect, meaning that all existing data collected about the
DS withdrawing his or her consent must be deleted? Or is it
simply a termination, thus with an ex nunc effect, allowing the
controller to maintain (but not process further) data already
collected79?
In other words, the problem can be expressed as follows.
Any personal data collected by the controller after the DS
consented to the processing has been collected lawfully, and
data are legitimately stored in the controller’s databases. But
when the DS withdraws consent, is the data controller allowed
to maintain those data? Or must any further procrastination
in erasing them be considered a violation?
It should be stated in advance that prior to the GDPR there
does not appear to be any definite answer to this question.
However, some hints can be found in the same definition of
“processing” provided by the DPD, particularly in the term
“storage”. If storage is intended as a static activity, i.e., the very
fact that data are maintained somewhere is considered storage,
then it should be argued that the controller is not allowed to
maintain those data anymore. On the other hand, if the concept
of storage is interpreted in a dynamic perspective, meaning the
activity that takes the data and places them in a place where
they will be maintained, then it should be concluded that there
is no prohibition to maintain those data, as long as no further
processing activity occurs.
Between these two visions, the latter would appear pref-
erable, because it is more in line with the rest of the definition.
Specifically, before the sample listing of a number of activi-
ties that are included within the definition of “processing”,
Article 2 defines processing as “any operation or set of opera-
tions”. Once the data have been stored, no operation occurs
in simply maintaining them statically.
However, this interpretation appears to raise more prob-
lems than it actually solves, at least on a practical basis. Indeed,
copying the data or transferring them from one location to
another would be considered data processing from the per-
spective of the DPD. Since most data centers make use of
backup copies or occasionally update their architectures by mi-
grating the data to a different hardware or software platform,
it would be very difficult to state that they are not “process-
ing” the data in doing so. However, this obstacle does not appear
to be insurmountable, because this situation could easily fall
within the boundaries of a legitimate processing on the basis
of Article 7, subparagraph f (“legitimate interests pursued by
the controller”). Ensuring the dependability of the control-
ler’s systems, or improving services by means of more adequate
hardware and software platforms, can probably be consid-
ered a legitimate derogation to the DS’s consent.
Another useful hint to understand the legal nature of
withdrawal is the Spanish ley orgánica, which actually imple-
ments a generalized right to withdraw a previously given
consent. The Spanish transposition clearly states that the
withdrawal “does not have retroactive effect”.80 Although this
is still insufficient to completely settle the issue, it is easier
to interpret the provision in the sense that the data control-
ler is not forced to delete the lawfully obtained data. This
interpretation would be more in line with the total exclusion
of any retroactive effects.
If the withdrawal of consent has a non-retroactive effect,
operating only by preventing any processing from that point
on, then it is all the more unlikely that it can be equated to
75 However, it appears that the right to object, as it is defined in
the DPD, was initially foreseen as a right to withdraw consent. The
evolution in the European Parliament discussions, starting from
the initial drafts of the DPD back in 1990, over time led to a re-
duction of that right, eventually transforming it in the current right
to object to data processing under certain circumstances. Curren
and Kaye, “Revoking Consent: A ‘blind Spot’ in Data Protection Law?”,
p. 277–278 carry on a detailed analysis of the changes that went
on. This strengthens the conclusion that the DPD does not grant
the right to withdraw one’s previously given consent, not even im-
plicitly. Yet, since nothing is stated against it either, Member States
are free to implement it if they deem necessary, as did Spain.
76 See Section 2.3 supra.
77 Article 2, subparagraph b.
78 Unless the processing is made lawful by other provisions in
Article 7 which disregard the DS’s consent, of course.
79 According to Messinetti, “Circolazione Dei Dati Personali E
Dispositivi Di Regolazione Dei Poteri Individuali, ” pp. 358–360, who
as a general rule admits that consent may be withdrawn, the legal
concepts of revocation and termination are inadequate in express-
ing the actual significance of an act contrary to a previous
authorization regarding the DS’s personal identity.This act can only
partially be subsumed under the classical legal concepts which cause
the interruption of an existing contract or legal relationship.
80 Spanish Ley orgánica 15/1999, article 6(3). See also footnote 71
supra.
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the right to be forgotten. The “right to be forgotten and to
erasure”, as its title implies81 requires the controller to erase
all data pertaining to the DS exercising it, with full retroactive
effect on data already collected.
Concluding, although the answer is not certain, it would
appear that not even the right to withdraw a previously given
consent can be used as a means of exercising a right to be for-
gotten. It does not appear then, that the DPD or Member State
legislation actually provide any means to allow a DS to request
a data controller the erasure of any personal data pertaining
to him or her, unless some legitimate reason such as inaccu-
rate data exists.
5. Reform proposal
The data protection reform proposal represents a major over-
haul of the existing data protection regime, attempting to set
a new level of data protection throughout all EU countries, ad-
dressing the emerging technologies which over the years have
posed new challenges in the field of data protection.The general
part of the reform is contained in a Regulation82 which is cur-
rently being reviewed and amended.
5.1. The right to be forgotten in the reform
The approval of the reform is facing difficulties and contro-
versy. One of the most debated problems is precisely the
enumerated right to be forgotten, explicitly stated in the title
of Article 17.83 This article has faced many changes and amend-
ments from the original text back in 2011. In particular, Article
17 has been completely rewritten since its original formula-
tion, and some parts of it have been removed and have become
separate articles.84 The original formulation was very
clear85 granting the DS the right to have any reference to data
completely erased from publicly available communication ser-
vices. However, this wording would have had unbearable
consequences from a technical point of view, therefore it has
undergone major changes.86
Article 17(1) provides several situations where the DS has
the right to be erased by the data controller. Of particular in-
terest is subparagraph b, which allows the DS to withdraw his
or her consent. In other words, based on the upcoming Regu-
lation, withdrawal of a previously given consent is sufficient
to have the right to have personal data erased by the control-
ler. This is a generalized means of withdrawing consent and
does not require any justification to be alleged to the erasure
request; whereas the Spanish ley orgánica requires “justified
grounds for doing so”.87 Also, the right to withdraw consent
is different from the right to object, which is per se another cir-
cumstance which legitimizes the removal request and is
expressed in subparagraph c immediately following the consent
withdrawal. It appears that the right to withdraw consent can
be applied to data processing that is based on the DS’s consent,
whereas the right to object applies to data processing which
is lawfully carried out regardless of the consent of the DS.
The right to withdraw consent is also contained in Article
7(3) of the GDPR, which states that “[the] data subject shall have
the right to withdraw his or her consent at any time. The with-
drawal of consent shall not affect the lawfulness of processing
based on consent before its withdrawal”. After the with-
drawal, any previous processing is still considered lawful, and
81 See footnote 83 infra.
82 The reform proposal is split into two documents, a Regulation
(document 2012/0011) and a Directive (document 2012/0010).
Whereas the GDPR contains the general provisions, and is basi-
cally the complete revision of the DPD, a separate directive is
currently under preparation for data protection in criminal inves-
tigations by public authorities. The choice has been controversial.
One of the key objectives of the reform is to make data protec-
tion consistent (European Commission, Why Do We Need an EU Data
Protection Reform?, 2012, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/
document/review2012/factsheets/1_en.pdf). Doubts have been ex-
pressed as to the need to have two separate disciplines, especially
given that the distinction underlying them (general data protec-
tion and criminal data protection) has been considered artificial
and inconsistent. This structure has been “met with regret by Eu-
rope’s data protection advocates” (Andra Giurgiu and Gérard
Lommel, “A New Approach To EU Data Protection,” Die Kritische
Vierteljahresschrift Für Gesetzgebung Und Rechtswissenschaft (KritV), no.
1 (2014): 10–27).
83 The current formulation of Article 17 is titled “Right to be for-
gotten and to erasure”.
84 Joris van Hoboken, “The Proposed Right to Be Forgotten Seen
from the Perspective of Our Right to Remember” (European Com-
mission, 2013), p. 16.
85 According to ibid., draft 51 provided the DS with a very strong
concept of the right to be forgotten, because Article 15(2) granted
the DS the right to obtain the erasure not only of the personal data
that he or she did not want to be publicly available anymore, but
also to all references to them: “[t]he data subject shall have the
right the right to obtain the erasure of any reference to data, which
are erased pursuant to paragraph 1, from any publicly available com-
munication service which allows or facilitates the search of or access
to this data”. This provision did not place a specific obligation upon
the controller, so problems would arise as to who would be re-
sponsible for the erasure (or liable for a lack thereof). However, the
formulation is very clear, because it explicitly states what the DS
is entitled to. Later, GDPR draft 56, Article 15(2) more clearly placed
the obligation to erase the data upon the data controller, stating
that “[w]here the controller referred to in paragraph 1 has made
the data public, it shall in particular ensure the erasure of any public
Internet link to, copy of, or replication of the personal data relat-
ing to the data subject contained in any publicly available
communication service which allows or facilitates the search of
or access to this personal data”. The text of draft 56 can be found
at http://www.statewatch.org/news/2011/dec/eu-com-draft-dp-reg
-inter-service-consultation.pdf.The Commission formulation takes
into account the technical difficulties the controller might have met
in the exercise of such a right on the DS’s part: “the controller [. . .]
shall take all reasonable steps [. . .] to inform third parties which
are processing such data, that a data subject requests them to erase
any links to, or copy or replication of that personal data” (Article
17(2)).
86 The official released version of the document still dates back
to January 2012. Some parliamentary reports and unofficial leaked
documents provide a different formulation, and there are now two
more articles (17a and 17b) concerning the right to be forgotten.
However, the content of the first two paragraphs has not changed
substantially from the 2012 version.
87 Spanish ley orgánica 15/1999, article 6(3). See Section 4.2 supra.
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the controller does not incur in liability (which occurs if the
consent has never been given and data are processed
nonetheless).88
Additionally, under the draft Regulation, the right to object
is another possible basis for the right to be forgotten “pursu-
ant to Article 19”.89 In other words, the original right to object
from the DPD is expanded, and under the new Regulation also
requires the controller to erase all data pertaining to the ob-
jecting DS. Under this formulation, it appears that the right to
be forgotten, as defined in the GDPR, is an extension of the origi-
nal right to object.
In the light of the recent decision by the CJEU90 the Euro-
pean Commission has stated91 that Article 12 of the DPD, by
allowing the DS to request the erasure of data that is no longer
necessary, already contained the principle at the basis of the
right to be forgotten, and “claims that the Commission has pro-
posed something fundamentally new in the Data Protection
Regulation are therefore wrong”. While they are certainly born
from a common background, the above seems to be an over-
statement from a legal point of view. The right to be forgotten
has a wider scope than the right to erasure of data which are
no longer necessary. Since the right to be forgotten lacks a re-
quirement (that data are no longer necessary), it can be
exercised under more general conditions.92
Article 17 contains a derogation which can prevent the
erasure of the DS’s personal data: withdrawing consent obtains
erasure only if “there is no other legal ground for the process-
ing of the data”. A contrario, if there are other legal grounds for
processing, the DS’s request will not force the controller to erase
the data.93 The provision seems to refer to other circum-
stances in which the processing of personal data would be
allowed even if the DS had never consented. In this case, the
DS cannot obtain erasure, unless the requirements for the right
to object also apply. In any case, the breadth of the deroga-
tion cannot be properly evaluated yet.
Most of the problems presented by Article 17, however, are
related to paragraph 2, which deals with other parties that may
have acquired the personal data for which the DS requests
erasure.94 This is a very common phenomenon in modern In-
ternet networks called “bouncing”, where a content published
on some website is replicated (normally by users) on other web-
sites. In these situations, the data controller must take any
reasonable steps to inform other data controllers of the DS’s
request for erasure.95
5.2. Problems in the application
A lot of problems arise from Article 17:
• the controller might not know or be able to contact all third
parties;
• third parties might have different grounds for the lawful-
ness of the data processing, so the erasure request might
not be effective toward them even if it is for the original
controller;
• in the case of Internet bounces, it is still unclear who the
third party controller responsible for the bounce actually
is, whether the manager of the service or its users. Modern
88 From a systematic perspective (see Section 4.3 supra), this is not
sufficient to determine whether the withdrawal is a revocation
which removes the original consent with an ex tunc and totally ret-
roactive effects, or as a termination which does not remove the
original consent but ex nunc ceases its effects. Both interpreta-
tions appear to be flawed with respect to the provision. The
revocation and its ex tunc effect would imply a fictio iuris where the
consent has never been given, therefore the intermediate process-
ing should not be lawful. The termination is incompatible with the
concept of “withdrawing” the consent, a “cessation” being more ap-
propriate. An intermediate interpretation might be preferable,
according to which the consent is actually revoked with retroac-
tive effects, but the controller does not incur in any liability because
it was based on legitimate expectations stemming from the DS’s
behavior.
89 Article 17(1), subparagraph c.
90 See Section 6.1 infra.
91 European Commission, Factsheet on the “Right to Be Forgotten”
Ruling, 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/data-protection/
news/140602_en.htm.
92 The opinion that the DPD does not contain, even implicitly, the
right to be forgotten, is dominant and preferable, maintained also
(see Section 6.1 infra) by the Advocate General of the Google Spain
case (Niilo Jääskinen, Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, 2013,
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid
=138782&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part
=1&cid=416370): “the Directive does not provide for a general right
to be forgotten” (par. 108; also par. 111: “Articles 12(b) and 14(a) [the
right to object] of the Directive do[es] not provide for a right to be
forgotten”), a right introduced in the reform not as “a codification
of existing law, but an important legal innovation” (par. 110). Ad-
ditionally, “any generalised right to be forgotten cannot be invoked
[. . .] on the basis of the Directive even when it is interpreted in
harmony with [Article 7 of] the Charter” (par. 136).
93 This is similar to the concept of “newsworthiness” that, ac-
cording to Barbas, “The Death of the Public Disclosure Tort: A
Historical Perspective”, caused the obsolescence of the tort of public
disclosure in the US. See also footnote 10 supra.
94 Par. 2 is related to any circumstance under which the DS is en-
titled to request erasure and not only to consent withdrawal.
95 The protection of the DS has been strongly degraded from the
original drafts of the GDPR. The DS does not have a definite right
to have his or her content erased by all data controllers that may
have acquired the data, but “the obligations are limited to taking
all reasonable steps’ to inform third parties” of the erasure request,
which is seen as an obligation of endeavor and not of result (Eu-
ropean Data Protection Supervisor, Opinion of the European Data
Protection Supervisor, 2012, https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/
webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/Consultation/Opinions/
2012/12-03-07_EDPS_Reform_package_EN.pdf, par. 146–148). van
Hoboken, “The Proposed Right to Be Forgotten Seen from the Per-
spective of Our Right to Remember,” p. 15 challenges this statement
because it would be an obligation of result with respect to the in-
formation of third parties; however, it actually appears an obligation
of endeavor, because technical difficulties might well put the con-
troller in a situation where even informing third parties, or even
knowing who they are, would not be feasible.Still, there is still some
room for significant changes. There is currently a proposal for a
different formulation of Article 17 of the GDPR (European Com-
mission, Factsheet on the “Right to Be Forgotten” Ruling). The DS would
have the right “to obtain [. . .] the erasure of any links to, or copy
or replication of that data”; and the controller “shall take all rea-
sonable steps to have the data erased, including by third parties”.
Also, the title of Article 17, according to this proposal, would be
“Right to erasure”. In this formulation, the right granted to the DS
appears much sharper and enforceable, and a heavier burden on
the controller.
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Internet has blurred the distinction between controllers and
DSs, and this is a weak spot in data protection laws.
The right to be forgotten is an instrument to protect the DS
against undesired use of his or her personal data. Under the
current legislation, DSs consenting to the processing of per-
sonal data are in an irreversible condition. Once the personal
data have been lawfully processed by a data controller, the DS
has no means of regaining complete control over them. The
right to be forgotten aims at restoring this control, by grant-
ing the DS the power not only to decide who will be allowed
to process his or her personal data (by giving consent), but also
who will no longer be allowed to process them (by request-
ing erasure). This is in line with the right to the protection of
personal data granted by the ECHR.96
Clearly, the right to the protection of personal data must
be balanced with freedom of expression, another fundamen-
tal right in the ECHR.97 Requesting the erasure of one’s personal
data may be considered legitimate when the other party has
merely a business interest, but it must not be used as a means
to impose censorship, or in any case to prevent freedom of ex-
pression unconditionally. For this reason, Article 80 of the GDPR
allows Member States to introduce further derogations and ex-
emptions from the provisions protecting the DS, including the
right to be forgotten, especially with respect to processing
carried out solely for journalistic, artistic or literary expression.
To sum it up: the reform proposal allows the DS to with-
draw consent, at will and without conditions (unless the
derogation described earlier applies98).The controller must then
erase all personal data pertaining to the DS, and forward the
same request to data controllers that are known to be pro-
cessing the data. Article 17 explicitly contains “right to be
forgotten” in the title. The question, at this point, is whether
this is actually a right “to be forgotten”, or it is not.
5.3. Scope of the right to be forgotten
Previous sections analyze what, in the authors’ opinion, the
right to be forgotten is not. It is not an application of the right
to object99 nor the equivalent of the withdrawal of consent100
although both are potential grounds to enact it. The unique
feature of the right to be forgotten, which makes it different
from the rights granted by the existing legislation, is its ret-
roactivity. The Google Spain decision does not address the right
to be forgotten, either.101
So, what is the right to be forgotten? Based on the above
considerations, it is a novelty that will be introduced by the
reform, which has a broader scope (and raises more prob-
lems) than any of the existing rights and has (rightfully) not
been enforced by courts yet.
The concept of “right to be forgotten” does not have a unique
definition. It originates in several European legislations, with
different meanings. In France, the droit à l’oubli is related to the
right that, after relevant news have been made public for the
sake of the right of information, a person has to remain se-
cluded, without further disclosure of his or her own private
life.102 In Italy, the diritto all’oblio is “the legitimate interest of
individuals not to be forever exposed to further damages to
his or her honor and reputation due to ongoing publication of
news that was legitimately spread in the past”.103 The Spanish,
on the basis of the derecho al olvido, has issued decisions that
forced data controllers to delete personal data that were no
longer useful for their purpose104 (but without the obligation
to propagate the erasure request). There is no definition of the
right to be forgotten at a European level; at most, the draft Regu-
lation describes it as “the right that their personal data are
erased and no longer processed”105 under certain circum-
stances, including withdrawing consent.
At a first glance, it would appear that the boundaries of such
a right are quite sharp, but its enforcing would pose major prob-
lems. Under the Regulation, the DS can request erasure to every
data controller who is processing the data, and not only to the
one who processed the data in the first place. The fact that the
DS gave consent only to the original controller does not appear
to be relevant: the obligation to erase the data arises when the
DS withdraws consent, without any specification on the con-
troller who received it. Theoretically, knowing all controllers
to whom his or her personal data have been bounced, the DS
would be entitled to obtain erasure by all of them.
This appears to be an actual “right to be forgotten”, an ab-
solute right to have data removed by every controller. If the
DS had the technical means to know all controllers who are
processing the data, Article 17(1) would adequately guaran-
tee such a right.106
The problem then becomes purely practical: knowing who
the controllers processing the data are.
For this reason, the draft Regulation goes beyond the obli-
gation of erasure. Since controllers are more likely to have
knowledge of third parties processing some data that they col-
lected, it places upon them the additional obligation to inform
96 Article 8.
97 At Article 10.
98 The derogation to Article 17, due to the generality of its for-
mulation, is a potential weak spot against a legitimate exercise of
the right to be forgotten. The right to be forgotten can be denied
if there are other legal grounds to continue the processing; it would
be easy for the controller to invoke such “legal grounds” such as
the right to exercise a business without losing data which are sig-
nificant assets.The exact breadth of the derogation will be depended
on future decisions by the CJEU.
99 Section 3.3 supra.
100 Section 4.3 supra.
101 As shown in Section 6.2 infra.
102 Alessandro Mantelero, “The EU Proposal for a General Data Pro-
tection Regulation and the Roots of the ‘right to Be Forgotten’,”
Computer Law & Security Review 29, no. 3 (2013): 229–35.
103 Corte di Cassazione, III sezione civile, “Sentenza 9 Aprile 1998,
N. 3679,” Il Foro Italiano 121, no. 6 (1998): 1833/1834–39/1840.
104 Artemi Rallo Lombarte, “El Derecho Al Olvido Y Su Protección,”
Telos, no. 85 (2010): 104–8.
105 Recital 53.
106 However, that there are some notable exceptions to this, mostly
in Chapter IX of the draft Regulation (“Provisions relating to spe-
cific data processing situations”). In these cases there must be a
balance of interest between the DS and data controllers. For
example, Article 80 contains exceptions for journalistic purposes,
meaning that the right of the DS to erasure is mitigated where there
are facts which have a relevance to the general public.
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those third parties about the erasure request.107 Although the
Regulation does not say it explicitly, this obligation would also
weigh transitively on every subsequent controller (otherwise
it could be easily eluded).
Controllers are required to implement technical solutions
to allow the tracking of bounces. In several cases, this is already
a reality. Major Internet services, for instance, tend not to rep-
licate shared content from an external source, but rather to
create a link to it and keep track of the link (this is also more
sustainable in terms of storage and performance). In the case
of erasure of the original resource, all links would be invali-
dated, thus actually achieving the erasure. Other services (less
involved in content sharing) tend to implement fewer tech-
nical measures to achieve this solution. However the trend is
moving already. Even services that traditionally are far away
from the “user-generated content” paradigm, such as online
newspapers, are actually starting to implement some “social”
features. In general, two opposite models can be envisioned
for sharing content: a distributed model and a centralized
model. In the former, controllers keep track of all links that
reference a given content (even if the data are replicated). In
the latter, a given content exists in a single instance, and every
dissemination of the data is simply a reference to the origi-
nal data; invalidating the originally-published data makes every
copy inaccessible. In general, a combination of these two so-
lutions is a very efficient (and easy to implement) solution to
guarantee the enforcement of Article 17(2).
6. The Google Spain decision
On May 13, 2014, the CJEU issued a decision in the case of Google
Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, Mario
Costeja González108 that received a lot of resonance. The main-
stream media and the general public, on the basis of this
decision, claim that the EU is enforcing the right to be
forgotten.109 However, this definitely appears to be an over-
statement. This section explores the findings of the decision
and compares them against the existing law and the upcom-
ing GDPR, explaining why the Google Spain decision does not
appear to actually relate with the right to be forgotten, but rather
with the right to object.
6.1. Facts and decision
In 2010, a Spanish citizen lodged with the Spanish Data Pro-
tection Authority (DPA), the Agencia Española de Protección de Datos
(AEPD), a complaint against a web site and against the Google
search engine (namely against the companies Google Spain and
Google Inc.), because a Google search with his name would allow
to retrieve some remote personal data that were stored on the
aforementioned web site and indexed by Google. The DS was
asking for the removal of such data.The AEPD rejected the com-
plaint related to the removal of the data from the original web
site, but upheld the one toward Google Spain and Google Inc.
The defendants later moved to annul against the AEPD deci-
sion before the Spanish High Court, which referred to the CJEU
for a preliminary ruling. The question was whether a search
engine should be considered a data controller according to the
DPD, and in case of an affirmative answer whether it was in
the power of the AEPD to order the search engine to “de-
index” some web pages upon the request of the DS, even if they
were legitimately published on the original web site.
First, the CJEU analyzed the relationship between the US-
based Google Inc. (owner of the search engine) and its Spain-
based subsidiary Google Spain (managing the advertising on
the Google website), finding that Google processed personal data
“in the context of the activities” of Google Spain. Therefore, the
Court decided that Google is subject to the national law trans-
posing the DPD.110 Even if Google Spain is not the data controller
or the data processor (Google Inc. is), the applicability of the
law descends from the related business of Google Spain, for
which the data processing is fundamental.
Then, the CJEU found that a search engine must definitely
be considered a data controller pursuant to Article 2 of the DPD,
because the search engine “collects”, “retrieves”, “records”,
“organises”, “stores”, “discloses” and “makes available”111 and
the fact that it does not modify the data is not relevant.112 The
processing activity of search engines, which is distinct from
that of the publishers of websites113 makes available data that
would not be found otherwise. The Court concluded that “the
operator of a search engine is obliged to remove [. . .] links to
web pages [. . .] even [. . .] when its publication in itself on those
pages is lawful”.114
Finally, with regards to the DS’s rights, the CJEU states that
the DS has the right to request that the search results are no
longer made available to the general public even if they remain
accessible to users of the web site where they reside, in case
they are the source of a prejudice to him or her; this right115
overrides the economic interest of the search engine, except
in the case where there is a public interest to information (pos-
sibly due to the public nature of the DS).116
Summing up the content of the decision, the search engine
is a data controller, and it must de-index personal data if an
easy search exposes data in a way that might be prejudicial
to the DS.
107 The GDPR currently has several different formulations. The text
to which this paper is referring to is the “official” released text, which
however dates back to 2012. It is possible that the obligation will
be different in the final text.
108 European Court of Justice, Decision C-131/12, ECLI:EU:C:2014:317.
109 Many commentators share this opinion. See footnote 123 infra
for a list.
110 European Court of Justice, Decision C-131/12, ECLI:EU:C:2014:317,
par. 60.
111 Ibid., par. 28.
112 Ibid., par. 29.
113 Ibid., par. 35.
114 Ibid., par. 88.
115 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union Article
7, “Respect for private and family life”; Article 8, “Protection of per-
sonal data”.
116 European Court of Justice, Decision C-131/12, ECLI:EU:C:2014:317,
par. 99.
231c om pu t e r l aw & s e cu r i t y r e v i ew 3 2 ( 2 0 1 6 ) 2 1 8 – 2 3 7
6.2. Analysis of the decision
Clearly, the Google Spain decision builds over many years of
evolution in the processing of personal data. The Court ac-
knowledges radical changes in the way personal data are stored
and accessed. Whereas back in time archives were accessible
only by actually visiting the archive location, the migration of
archives to IT systems and the vital role of search engines in
modern society makes personal data ubiquitously accessible
and at the hand of any individual. The fact that the data exist
and are stored somewhere is not prejudicial to the DS’s repu-
tation per se.The damage stems from the possibility of instantly
retrieving the data by means of search engines; and this is
where the decision places itself.
The decision in itself is extremely revolutionary, because
it emphasizes the role of an intermediate data controller/
processor (the search engine), one which is not the data
controller that legally processed the data in the first place. The
search engine does not do anything that a normal user would
not be able to do, but it does so massively by means of web
crawling software (“spiders”) and with a huge storage capac-
ity. The responsibility of data controllers is thus emphasized
from a quantitative point of view (the amount of data that are
made accessible) and not just a qualitative one (the ways in
which data are processed).
However, the decision does not actually seem to cover the
right to be forgotten, but rather it appears to be more related
with the right to object. There are several hints to this:
• the literal argument of the Court. The decision117 states that
the links must be removed from the list of results by virtue
of Articles 12 subparagraph b and 14(1) subparagraph a118;
• the decision hinged on the prejudice suffered by the DS, in
line with the right to object under most legislation, and in
contrast with the right to be forgotten which does not require
the DS to prove any damage;
• the Google Spain decision does not even require that the
search engine erase the personal data of the DS, but only
that it avoid presenting them to users upon a web search
performed using the plaintiff’s first and last name as
keywords;
• since Google is not required to delete those data, when a
search with the relevant keywords is performed, there must
be a technical means that excludes the unwanted results
from the listing. This is actually a form of data processing;
the decision imposes Google to process the data (even only
ad excludendum), whereas Article 17 of the draft Regulation
prevents any further processing apart from the erasure
itself;
• in any case, it would be incorrect to require that the search
engine erase the information, because a search engine nor-
mally does not store the web sites it indexes, but rather
stores links to the web sites itself, along with some metadata
(exceptions occur with respect to caching, temporary storage
of data). Therefore, the obligation to “erase” the data would
have been useless. On the other hand, the obligation to avoid
that, through a series of operation, the data were re-
trieved and made available even if stored on servers over
which Google has no control, actually achieved the desired
result119;
• bluntly, there is no right to be forgotten to enforce in the
current legislation (the DPD), even though it will be present
in the GDPR once it is approved;
• even taking into account the right to be forgotten as it is
defined in the GDPR, the decision does not seem to be
applying it, because under Article 17 of the GDPR the data
controller is obliged to “take all reasonable steps” to inform
third parties of the deletion request, or to obtain the erasure
from them120; whereas the Google Spain decision clearly
stated that only the search engine, and not the original
website, was obliged to de-index the data.121
The case seems to cover a particular application of the
right to object, because it targets a secondary processing of
the data and not the data controller who originally pro-
cessed the data. However, this is perfectly in line with the
content of the right to object. In particular, while a controller
(the original web site) is allowed to process the personal
data pertaining to the DS, another one (the search engine) is
not.122
117 Ibid., par. 99.
118 The Court is consistent: par. 88, “Article 12(b) and subpara-
graph (a) of the first paragraph of Article 14 of Directive 95/46 are
to be interpreted as meaning that [. . .] the operator of a search
engine is obliged to remove from the list of results [. . .]”; par. 98,
“the data subject may, by virtue of Article 12(b) and subparagraph
(a) of the first paragraph of Article 14 of Directive 95/46, require those
links to be removed”.
119 Correctly, European Court of Justice, Decision C-131/12,
ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, par. 99 states that the DS has a right that “the
information in question no longer be made available to the general
public on account of its inclusion in such a list of results”.This does
not imply that the data controller must erase the data (rectius, the
links to the location where the data are stored) completely.
120 Depending on the exact formulation of Article 17, since there
are several existing versions: one available to the public domain,
one as an internal working document (recently leaked out), and a
different proposal by the European Parliament which has been
shown by European Commission, Factsheet on the “Right to Be For-
gotten” Ruling. See also footnote 95 supra.
121 Specifically, the Court, at European Court of Justice, Decision C-131/
12, ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, par. 99 states that, under Article 12
subparagraph b and 14(1) subparagraph a of the DPD, the DS has
a right that “the information in question no longer be made avail-
able to the general public on account of its inclusion in such a list
of results”. This does not imply that the data controller must erase
the data (rectius, the links to the location where the data are stored)
completely.
122 The same conclusion has been reached by the Google Advi-
sory Council (Luciano Floridi et al., “The Advisory Council to Google
on the Right to Be Forgotten” (Google Advisory Council, 2015), p.
5), according to which “the Ruling does not establish a general Right
to be Forgotten”, but rather “invokes a data subject’s right to object
to, and require cessation of, the processing of data about himself
or herself”.
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6.3. Aftermath
The decision was generally welcomed with favor by data
protection advocates, who saw an application of the right to
be forgotten in it.123 Nonetheless, the preferable interpreta-
tion is that the decision is not anchored to the right to be
forgotten, at least not as it is formulated in the reform
proposal.124 While it can be assumed that the CJEU, in the
application of existing DPD provisions, has undergone an
evolutive interpretation that runs along the same line of a
principle underlying the reform proposal125 the assumption126
that the judges have anticipated some of the provisions of
the reform cannot be upheld.
The importance of the Google Spain decision was also felt
when, on 10 July 2014, the Italian Authority for the protection
of personal data (Garante per la protezione dei dati personali) issued
itself a decision against Google Inc.127 The Garante found that
the Google Spain decision enforces the diritto all’oblio.128 As a
follow-up to this decision, the Garante, on the basis of an
123 In particular early commentators, for example W. Gregory Voss,
“The Right to Be Forgotten in the European Union: Enforcement
in the Court of Justice and Amendment to the Proposed General
Data Protection Regulation,” Journal of Internet Law 18, no. 1 (2014):
3–7; John W. Kropf, “Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de
Protección de Datos (AEPD). Case C-131/12,” The American Journal
of International Law 108, no. 3 (2014): 502–9. However, the reso-
nance of the decision as enforcing the right to be forgotten still
appears to be predominant in doctrine: see for example Hannah
Crowther, “Google v Spain: Is There Now a ‘right to Be Forgot-
ten’?,” Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice 9, no. 11 (2014):
892–93; Patrick Van Eecke and Anthony Cornette, “What the CJEU
Has Actually Decided in Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia
Española de Protección de Datos, Mario Costeja González, No. C-131/
12,” Computer Law Review International 15, no. 4 (2014): 101–7; Sabrina
Peron, “Il Diritto All’oblio Nell’era Dell’informazione On-Line,”
Responsabilità Civile E Previdenza, no. 4 (2014): 1177–91; Andrés Boix
Palop, “El Equilibrio Entre Los Derechos Del Artículo 18 de La
Constitución, El ‘derecho Al Olvido’ Y Las Libertades Informativas
Tras La Sentencia Google,” Revista General de Derecho Administrativo
38 (2015); Daniel Krošlák, “Practical Implementation of the Right
to Be Forgotten in the Context of Google Spain Decision,” Commu-
nication Today 6, no. 1 (2015): 59–71; Alberto Salarelli, “Ancora Sul
Diritto All’oblio: Cosa Cambia Dopo La Sentenza Della Corte Di
Giustizia Europea Contro Google,” Italian Journal of Library, Ar-
chives, and Information Science 6, no. 1 (2015): 147–60; Kit Burden, “EU
Update,” Computer Law & Security Review 31, no. 1 (2015): 139–45;
Robert Lee III Bolton, “The Right to Be Forgotten: Forced Amnesia
in a Technological Age,” The John Marshall Journal of Information Tech-
nology and Privacy Law 31, no. 2 (2015): 133–44;Anna Rita Popoli, “Il
Diritto All’oblio Approda Alla Corte Europea Dei Diritti dell’Uomo:
Ma Non Viene Menzionato,” Giustizia Civile.com, no. 3 (2015);
Alessandro Mantelero, “Il Futuro Regolamento EU Sui Dati Personali
E La Valenza ‘politica’ Del Caso Google: Ricordare E Dimenticare
Nella Digital Economy,” Il Diritto Dell’informazione E Dell’informatica XXX,
no. 4–5 (10 2014): 681–701; Herke Kranenborg, “Google and the Right
to Be Forgotten,” European Data Protection Law Review 1, no. 1 (2015):
70–79; Giorgio Resta and Vincenzo Zeno-Zencovich, eds., Il Diritto
All’Oblio Su Internet Dopo La Sentenza Google Spain, vol. 3, Consumatori
E Mercato (Roma TrE-Press, 2015) and maybe Eleni Frantziou, “Further
Developments in the Right to Be Forgotten: The European Court of Jus-
tice’s Judgment in Case C-131/12, Google Spain, SL, Google Inc v Agencia
Espanola de Proteccion de Datos,” Human Rights Law Review 14, no. 4
(2014): 761–77, although some properly highlight the difference
between the traditional concept of a right to be forgotten and its
definition in Article 17 of the proposed Regulation. Some authors
(Sónia de Carvalho, “The Right to Be Forgotten: An Analysis of the
CJEU’s Google Spain Judgment,” in Proceedings of the 3rd Electronic
International Interdisciplinary Conference (EIIC), vol. 3 (EDIS – Publish-
ing Institution of the University of Zilina, 2014), 202–10; Ioannis
Iglezakis, The Right to Be Forgotten in the Google Spain Case (Case C-131/
12): A Clear Victory for Data Protection or an Obstacle for the Internet?,
2014, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2472323) even state that the Court
maintains that the right to be forgotten is rooted in the general
principles of the Directive, but such claims do not appear to be sup-
ported in the ruling.
124 In this sense, the Advocate General points out in Jääskinen,
Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen that the right to be forgotten
cannot be inferred from the current legislation. Also Elizabeth Kelsey,
“Google Spain SL and Google Inc v AEPD and Mario Costeja Gon-
zalez: Protection of Personal Data, Freedom of Information and the
‘right to Be Forgotten,’” European Human Rights Law Review 4 (2014):
395–400; Stefan Kulk and Frederik J. Zuiderveen Borgesius, “Google
Spain v. González: Did the Court Forget About Freedom of Expres-
sion?,” European Journal of Risk Regulation, no. 3 (2014): 389–98; Pierre-
André Dubois, “Search Engines and Data Protection – a Welcome
Practical Approach by the Advocate General,” Computer and Tele-
communications Law Review 19, no. 7 (2013): 206–8; Ignacio N. Cofone,
“Google v. Spain: A Right to Be Forgotten?,” Chicago-Kent Journal of
International and Comparative Law 15, no. 1 (2015): 1–11, and appar-
ently Tommaso Scannicchio, “Tutela Della Privacy: Motori Di Ricerca
E Diritto All’oblio,” Giurisprudenza Italiana, 2014, 1323–25 who avoids
relating the decision to Article 17.Christiana Markou, “The ‘Right
to Be Forgotten’: Ten Reasons Why It Should Be Forgotten,” in Re-
forming European Data Protection Law, ed. Serge Gutwirth, Ronald
Leenes, and Paul de Hert, vol. 20, Law, Governance and Technol-
ogy Series (Springer, The Netherlands, 2014), 203–26 observes that
the absence of a reference to the expression “right to be forgot-
ten” in the decision suggests that the right granted by Article 17
of the proposed Regulation can be achieved by means of erasure,
without the need of a “forgotten” label; however, this position seems
to underestimate the differences between the content of Article
17 and the CJEU ruling.
125 Also in the light of the length of the approval procedure and
the difficulties that the reform is encountering.
126 Mantelero, “Il Futuro Regolamento EU Sui Dati Personali E La
Valenza ‘politica’ Del Caso Google: Ricordare E Dimenticare Nella
Digital Economy.”
127 Garante per la protezione dei dati personali, Decision Setting Forth
Measures Google Inc. Is Required to Take to Bring the Processing of Per-
sonal Data under Google’s New Privacy Policy into Line with the Italian
Data Protection Code – 10 July 2014, 2014, http://www.garanteprivacy.it/
web/guest/home/docweb/-/docweb-display/docweb/3295641.The de-
cision was issued as the outcome of an ex officio verification
concerning the new Google privacy policy. Other EU DPAs have un-
dergone similar procedures (Judith Rauhofer, “Of Men and Mice:
Should the EU Data Protection Authorities’ Reaction to Google’s New
Privacy Policy Raise Concern for the Future of the Purpose Limi-
tation Principle?,” European Data Protection Law Review 1, no. 1 (2015):
5–15).
128 The Italian diritto all’oblio is conceptually different (and less in-
cisive) from the right to be forgotten as it is defined in the draft
Regulation. See Section 5.3 supra.
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undisclosed verification protocol129 imposed specific measures130
upon Google, including greater transparency in the privacy
policy, consent to profiling, full right to object, anonymization,
deletion of personal information, and delisting of results.131 The
decision of the Garante is quite different from that of the CJEU,
since it requires Google “to adopt a data deletion policy” based
on the sole request of authenticated users. This is definitely
more in line with the European draft concept of the right to
be forgotten. In short, and approximately, the CJEU applies the
diritto all’oblio, whereas the Garante applies the right to be
forgotten.
Google’s reaction to the Google Spain decision has been
twofold. On one side, it has complied with the ruling, by cre-
ating an online form132 which allows DS to request deletion from
the search engine results. The form explicitly mentions CJEU’s
decision C-131/12 as the basis for the deletion request.The form
does not require the DS to enter a motivation for the dele-
tion request; this is more in line with the right to be forgotten
than the right to object, which normally requires the DS to mo-
tivate or justify the objection. Sources report that a large number
of users have been requesting deletion.133 On the other hand,
it established an advisory council134 to discuss the Google Spain
decision. The advisory council published a report135 which
defines the criteria and procedures that should be adopted
when assessing a delisting request by a DS. The report notes
that an evaluation of the possible harm that might come to
the DS is required when assessing a delisting request, to guar-
antee the correct balancing between the data protection rights
of the DS and the “interest of the general public in having [. . .]
access to the information”.136 The actual presence of harm was
disregarded by the CJEU.
6.4. The decision by the European Court of Human Rights
On September 18, 2014, another significant decision was issued,
this time by the European Court of Human Rights that might
add new fuel to the discussion on the right to be forgotten. The
decision137 states that the retention of personal data even in
the specific case implied a violation of the claimant’s rights,
because the processing of those data was no longer justified
by the original purpose they were collected for. According to
the few commentators138 the Court, without expressly men-
tioning it based its decision upon the right to be forgotten.
The juridical basis is necessarily different. While the CJEU
decided according to the DPD, the European Court based its
decision on Article 8 of the ECHR.
By ruling in favor of the claimant on the basis of an obli-
gation to erase personal data, the right invoked by the European
Court of Human Rights is closer to the right to be forgotten139
than the obligation imposed by the CJEU. The duty to erase the
personal data from the original source is what the CJEU did
not (and probably could not) enforce.
7. Conclusions
In an age of instant access to vast amount of material, policy
makers must search for solutions which allow digital citi-
zens the ability to maintain control over the image they present
to the world. The DPD represented a step in this direction.
Adopted in 1995, during the infancy of digital age, it repre-
sented a progressive protection regime which addressed
technological developments of that age. Since then the Inter-
net has exploded and changed the landscape of what it means
to be a digital citizen. It has transformed the concepts of privacy,
access and consent.
Yet with each action comes a reaction. One such action is
currently being undertaken in the form of the GDPR, which
seeks to shift the balance of power away from the data con-
trollers in favor of the DSs, if only ever so slightly. Through its
adoption of a right to be forgotten the EU will simplify and em-
bolden citizens’ right to control their image in the web. The
existing provisions which allow limited editorial control based
129 Garante per la protezione dei dati personali, Approvazione Del
Protocollo Di Verifica Che Disciplina Le Attività Di Controllo Da Parte Del
Garante Sulle Prescrizioni Impartite a Google Il 10 Luglio 2014 – 22 Gennaio
2015, 2015, http://www.garanteprivacy.it/web/guest/home/docweb/-/
docweb-display/docweb/3738244.
130 Garante per la protezione dei dati personali, Google to Comply
with the Privacy Measures Set Forth by the Italian DPA, 2015,
http://www.garanteprivacy.it/web/guest/home/docweb/-/docweb
-display/docweb/3740585.
131 Distinguishing deletion of personal data and delisting of results
corroborates the opinion that the Google Spain decision does not
enforce the right to be forgotten.
132 https://support.google.com/legal/contact/lr_eudpa?product
=websearch.
133 For one, Gary Cutlack, Google Swamped by ‘Right to Be Forgotten’
Deletion Requests, 2014, http://www.gizmodo.co.uk/2014/07/google
-swamped-by-right-to-be-forgotten-deletion-requests/ reports that,
as of 11 July 2014, 70,000 requests concerning 250,000 web pages
were received.
134 https://www.google.com/advisorycouncil/.
135 Floridi et al., “The Advisory Council to Google on the Right to
Be Forgotten.”
136 Ibid., p. 6.
137 European Court of Human Rights, Affaire Brunet C. France, 2014,
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-146389.
The case concerns a man whose data were placed in a criminal
archive, but after he reached a mediation his data were not erased,
despite his judicial request for their erasure. The claimant com-
plained that retaining the data for the prescribed duration of twenty
years despite the mediation was illegitimate, and the European Court
upheld his claim.
138 Juliette Gaté, “STIC: La France Doit Respecter Un Certain Droit
à L’oubli Dans Ses Fichiers Policiers,” Dalloz Actualité, 2014; Popoli,
“Il Diritto All’oblio Approda Alla Corte Europea Dei Diritti dell’Uomo:
Ma Non Viene Menzionato.” The latter observes that there is a sig-
nificant difference between the traditional concepts of the droit à
l’oubli and the decision by the European Court. Normally, the droit
à l’oubli is anchored to the lack of general interest in some infor-
mation after a significant amount of time. In the case under
examination, the Court applies the same right even in the absence
of a lengthy time span. The factual basis, according to the author,
appears to be the presumption of innocence of the claimant.
139 According to Popoli, “Il Diritto All’oblio Approda Alla Corte
Europea Dei Diritti dell’Uomo: Ma Non Viene Menzionato.”, the de-
cision by the European Court is an application of the right to be
forgotten, which was previously applied by the CJEU.The author seems
to overlook the fundamental differences between the content of
the two decisions.
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on objection or consent will be replaced. Yet, in the mean-
time, the CJEU’s decision against Google Spain has, to a certain
extent, complicated the debate. Does the decision recognize
a previously existing right to be forgotten? Or rather is the Court
simply morphing the right to objection in order to fill a void
in existing law in order to protect rights of users within the
spirit of existing legislation?
The Court could not enforce a right that does not exist in
the current legislation. And yet, what it could do was to plant
the seeds, to affirm something that goes in the direction of the
right to be forgotten, although it is a mere application of the
right to object.
What did the Court achieve? Very much, and very little. The
clear statement that the search engine is a data controller is
a definite step forward in adapting the existing data protec-
tion principles to the new technological context. And yet, on
a concrete ground, the effect on the case was the opposite than
the upholding of the claim actually aimed at. The original
content on the Spanish website is still available; it cannot be
found on Google Spain using only the name of the claimant
as the search string, but the search service from different coun-
tries still displays those results, as does the Spanish service
by using a more detailed search string; and the claimant has
earned a lot of visibility, which was probably the opposite of
what he wanted.
Under the existing legal framework, the Court could not
require the original data to be erased. At any rate, those data
(actually a copy of an old issue of a newspaper from the archive
repository) were unlikely to be looked for in the original website,
thus not causing any harm to the claimant’s reputation. The
harm came from the fact that the search engine brought under
present light something that had no real interest. The deci-
sion finds a balance between the rights granted by Articles 8
and 11 of the Charter: once the public interest in the infor-
mation on the subject has ceased, the right to the DS’s personal
data must prevail.
The Court stopped here. The decision was based on the
context “here and now”, and several critical issues were left
open. First off, many search strings, involving or not the name
of the DS, display those results. To what extent should the
search engine be forced to disable those results? Of course, if
Google is obliged to avoid the indexing of those results in re-
sponse to more search strings, the limitation to the freedom
of information is stronger, and at some point the balance shifts.
Finding the perfect balance is extremely hard, but that topic
was not discussed in the decision.
Second, the Court discussed the facts in a static perspec-
tive. If the DS runs for a political career or a position with
significant public responsibilities, then maybe what has been
considered an obsolete and irrelevant information about his
past financial problems may become interesting again in the
eyes of the public. The transparency of the information to
the public might suddenly shift the balance back in favor of
the ease in finding those results. A dynamic analysis of the pos-
sible scenarios is not available yet.
It seems that the Court planted a seed. Possibly, it used the
case to put its endorsement upon an idea which has been strug-
gling to gain full approval from the legislature of the European
Union, even without recognizing its existence under the current
legal framework: the right to be forgotten. Quite possibly, the
Court is sending a signal that it will recognize the essence of
a right until it is adopted into codified law.
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